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The problem of Information Retrieval is, given a set of documents D and a
query q, providing an algorithm for retrieving all documents in D relevant to q.
However, retrieval should depend and be updated whenever the user is able to
provide as an input a preferred set of relevant documents; this process is known
as relevance feedback. Recent work in IR has been paying great attention to
models which employ a logical approach; the advantage being that one can have
a simple computable characterization of retrieval on the basis of a pure logical
analysis of retrieval. Most of the logical models make use of probabilities or
similar belief functions in order to introduce the inductive component whereby
uncertainty is treated. Their general paradigm is the following: find the na-
ture of conditional d → q and then define a probability on the top of it . We
just reverse this point of view; first use the numerical information, frequencies
or probabilities, then define your own logical consequence. More generally, we
claim that retrieval is a form of deduction. We introduce a simple but powerful
logical framework of relevance feedback, derived from the well founded area of
nonmonotonic logic. This description can help us evaluate, describe and com-
pare from a theoretical point of view previous approaches based on conditionals
or probabilities.
The first difficulty one encounters towards a logical approach to Information
Retrieval is how one should view the algorithm which returns a set of relevant
documents. Our proposal is to see such an algorithm as a proof. However, this
proof is not classical because, as it is widely recognized, q → d, where q is a query
and d a document relevant to q, is not conveyed by the material implication
(see [vR86],[vR89]). Also, as the set of data which this proof is based is subject
to updating, nonmotonicity arises. Since there is no need of nesting implications,
implication and deduction can be identified and therefore our starting point is
to axiomatize a deduction q ∼ d. The consequence relation ∼ will reflect the
properties that relevance satisfies. A similar approach where nonmonotonic
1
α ⊢ β
α∼ β
(Supraclassicality)
⊢ α ≡ β α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence)
α∼ β β ⊢ γ
α∼ γ
(Right Weakening)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α∼ β ∧ γ
(And)
α∼ β α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ γ
(Cut)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity)
α0 ∼ α1 · · · αn−1 ∼ αn αn ∼ α0
α0 ∼ αn
(Loop)
α∼ γ β ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(Or)
α 6∼ ¬β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Rational Monotonicity)
Table 1: Rules for Nonmonotonic Inference
consequence relations are used to axiomatize a notion of aboutness appears in
[BH95]. We shall then show how ∼ changes with relevance feedback.
A set of rules for the relevance relation ∼ appears in Table 1. This set of
rules apart from Rational Monotonicity comprises the system P (see [KLM90])
of preferential inference. Preferential inference along with the rule of Rational
Monotonicity comprises the system R of rational inference (see [LM92]). We
propose preferential and rational inference as the simplest and strongest systems
axiomatizing the notion of relevance.
However, it is well known that designing a nonmonotonic system is far from
trivial. Moreover, nonmonotonicity does not correspond directly to statistical
data as statistical operations are in general continuous or monotonic. A solution
to this problem is given by a recent characterization of the systems of preferen-
tial and rational inference through systems of monotonic consequence relations
([Geo96b]) called priority relations . A presentation of priority relations follows.
Our language of terms will contain only conjunction (∧). The reason we do not
employ a notion of negation is that there is no notion of negation which reflects
our intuition in IR. The standard way to look at negation is ruled by the closed
world assumption: if a term does not occur in a document then its negation
occurs. However this makes documents possible worlds and deduction would
turn out classical in our model. Hence negation will be replaced by another
construction (see below). Documents will be identified with the conjunction of
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all terms that occur in them. So, if {t1, . . . , tn} are all documents occurring in
a document d, then d = t1 ∧ . . .∧ tn. Our model is based on a recent character-
ization of nonmonotonicity by the second author through a family of relations
among formulas called priority relations . A priority relation satisfies
1. t1 ≺ t1 (Reflexivity)
2. t1|=t2 and t2 ≺ t3 implies t1 ≺ t3 (Monotonicity)
3. t1|=t2 and t2|=t1 implies t3 ≺ t1 iff t3 ≺ t2, (Logical Equivalence)
where |= is classical. If a priority relation satisfies, in addition,
4. t3 ≺ t1 and t3 ≺ t2 implies t3 ≺ t1 ∧ t2, (Right Conjunction)
5. t1 ≺ t2 and t2 ≺ t3 implies t1 ≺ t3, (Transitivity)
it will be called preferential ordering. If a preferential ordering satisfies, in ad-
dition,
6. t1 ≺ t2 or t2 ≺ t1 (Connectivity)
it is called rational ordering.
We now have the following theorem ([Geo96a],[Geo]): Preferential and Ra-
tional inference relations are generated by preferential and rational orderings,
respectively, through a maxiconsistent inference scheme. Moreover, this corre-
spondence is bijective. This is a powerful machinery for handling nonmonotonic
deductions. Once we build a preference (preferential or rational) ordering, we
are able to define and compute the associated nonmonotonic consequence rela-
tion. Turning conjunction to union of sets of terms the defining conditions of
priority relations become:
1. U ≺ U (Reflexivity)
2. U ⊆ V and U ≺ W implies V ≺ W (Monotonicity)
3. U ≺ V and U ≺ W implies U ≺ V ∪W , (Right Union)
4. U ≺ V and V ≺ W implies U ≺ W , (Transitivity)
5. U ≺ V or V ≺ U (Connectivity)
One can think of these monotonic consequence relations as aboutness re-
lations. That aboutness should be represented as a monotonic consequence
relation appears already in ([HD95]) along with a mix of nonmonotonic rules.
Moreover, the above duality theorem translates to the fact that relevance and
aboutness are really dual notions. We shall now show how one can easily gener-
ate a preferential ordering from frequency information. We show how the user’s
relevance defines a nonmonotonic consequence relation which is represented by
a preferential ordering. In IR, a way to define the informative content of terms is
given by the frequencies in the document collection (as in the Robertson Sparck
Jones formula): this is enough for us to carry on deductions! A way of con-
structing a preferential ordering among terms is to divide the set of documents
that the user distinguishes into two subsets, the positive set (D+) and negative
set (D−). Then the set of positive and negative examples will use frequencies
to construct two rational orderings. Then these orderings will be combined in
a preferential ordering which reflects our intuitions for relevance. Then a doc-
ument d = t′1 ∧ . . . ∧ t
′
m will be relevant to query q = t1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn just in case
t1 ∧ . . .∧ tn ≺ t
′
1 ∧ . . .∧ t
′
m. The construction is the following. Denote with D
+
t
the set of positive relevant documents where t occurs, similarly for the nega-
tive case. The frequency of t relative to D+ is |D+t |. Now define the following
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orderings
t1 ≺ pt2 iff |D
+
t1
| ≤ |D+t2 |.
and
t2 ≺ nt1 iff |D
−
t1
| ≤ |D−t2 |.
It can be shown that ≺ p and ≺ n are rational orderings. Now let
t1 ≺ t2 iff t1 ≺ pt2 and t1 ≺ nt2.
The consequence relation ≺ is a preferential ordering. It is now clear that if
we perform an update of the sets of positive and negative relevant documents
with relevance feedback then ≺ changes, too. In particular, this change is
nonmonotonic.
Consider the following example. The following matrix is the matrix of oc-
currences between documents d1, d2, d3, d4 and terms t1, t2, t3, t4.
t1 t2 t3 t4
d1 0 1 0 1 +
d2 0 1 1 0 +
d3 0 0 1 1 −
d4 1 0 0 1 −
We have t1 ≺ p{t3, t4} ≺ pt2 and t4 ≺ n{t1, t3} ≺ nt2. Thus t1 ≺ t3 ≺ t2 and
t4 ≺ t2. For example, t3 ∧ t4 ≺ d1 and t3 ∧ t4 ≺ d3, that is the query t3 ∧ t4
returns d1 and d3 as relevant documents, but not d2 and d4. This provides a
model for computing the relevance of documents with respect a query on the
basis of some evidence.
Consider now a new document d5 = t1 ∧ t2. We have that d5 is not to-
tally ranked among the rest of the documents: we can decide just d5 ≺ d2 and
d4 ≺ d5. Let U be the number of undecided documents, D
+
p be the set of posi-
tive documents d such that d≺ d5, D
−
n be the set of negative documents d such
that d5 ≺ d, D
+
n be the set of positive documents d such that d5 ≺ d, and D
−
p
be the set of negative documents d such that d ≺ d5. If we want to create such
a linear ordering among documents we can use the the Robertson Spark Jones’
formula and relate it to the number of incomparable documents. Then
N − U
N
log
(
D+p ×D
−
n
D−p ×D
+
n
)
.
can be used as a decision rule. In the above example, we get a negative value
for d5 which is then chosen as irrelevant.
A point whose importance should be stressed is that generation of a non-
monotonic consequence relation (relevance) through priority relations depends
on a notion of negation. Only in presence of negation we are able to define maxi-
consistent inference (see [Geo96b]). We shall now show how a recent approach
to IR ([AvRU96]) using expected utility functions defines a natural notion of
negation. Suppose that the user supplies two sets of documents representing
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positive and negative examples. Through theses sets and the frequencies of
terms appearing in those sets one can construct for every term a contingency
matrix. Using now entropy H and Hintikka’s content C, one can define a weight-
ing function from the set of terms to the interval [−1, 1]. Let w be the weighting
function. Set w(¬t) = −w(t) and w(t ∧ t′) = min(w(t), w(t′)). Let
r(t) =
{
w(t) if w(t) > 0
0 otherwise
The function r ranks terms according to their utility. Now the following relation
t1 ≺ t2 iff r(t1) ≤ r(t2)
is a rational ordering, and the inference
t1 ∼ t2 iff t1 ∧ t3 ⊢ t2, for some t3 6≺ ¬t1
is a rational nonmonotonic inference. The above relation can be readily extend
to all boolean combinations of terms. However, we consider only conjunctions
of positive terms. Then the rational inference can be effectively checked through
the following equivalent definition (t1 and t2 are sets of terms)
t1 ∼ t2 iff either t2 ⊆ t1,
or t2 − t1 6≺ ¬t1.
As an example consider three terms t1, t2 and t3 and their contingency
matrices based on a set of 300 relevant documents and a set of 700 irrelevant
documents:
Rel Rel
t1 0 300
t1 626 74
Rel Rel
t2 24 276
t2 676 24
Rel Rel
t3 290 10
t3 47 653
The weighting function now gives the following
w(t1) = −.802
w(t2) = −.885
w(t3) = .845
w(t1 ∧ t2) = −.885
r(t1) = 0
r(t2) = 0
r(t3) = .845
r(t1 ∧ t2) = 0
We now have t1 ∼ t3, since .845 6≤ .802, but t1 ∧ t2 6∼ t3, since .845 ≤ .885.
A table of all possible derivations between terms appears below:
q ∼ d t1 t2 t3 t1 ∧ t2 t1 ∧ t3 t2 ∧ t3
t1 Y N Y N Y N
t2 N Y N N N N
t3 N N Y N N N
t1 ∧ t2 Y Y N Y N N
t1 ∧ t3 Y N Y N Y N
t2 ∧ t3 N Y Y N N Y
This logical framework is just an initial suggestion for future research, which
shows that nonmonotonicity, induction and IR can have many common features
which are worthwhile to explore.
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